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Abstract
This paper investigates how the passage of time a˙ects trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation.
We use a hybrid lab and online experiment to provide the frst evidence for the persistent power of
communication. Even when 3 weeks pass between messages and actual choices, communication
raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. Lags between the beginning
of the interaction and the time to respond do not substantially alter trust or trustworthiness.
Our results further suggest that the fndings of the large experimental literature on trust that
focuses on laboratory scenarios in which subjects are forced to choose their actions immediately
after communicating, may translate to more ecologically valid settings in which individuals
choose actions outside the lab and long after they initially made promises.
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Introduction

Trust is the foundation for many social and economic interactions and acts as “an important lubricant
of the social system” (Arrow, 1974). In particular, when contractual or reputational incentives are
weak, trust between the two parties that either side will hold up their end of the bargain becomes
particularly important. Trust often has to be repaid later, and promises have to be made good only
after some time has passed. Indeed, the very purpose of promises is to foster the belief in future
actions.1
Casual observation suggests that the more the act of trust, or the promise, recedes into the
past, the likelier it is for the promisee to neglect her obligation and to behave opportunistically. For
example, a stereotype about politicians is that they promise everything to get elected, but over time
conveniently “forget” their promises. The German post-war chancellor Konrad Adenauer famously
uttered “What do I care about my chitchat from yesterday?” (Weymar, 1955). Proverbs from various
cultures such as “Evening promises are like butter: morning comes, and it’s all melted.” or “Promises
are like the full moon, if they are not kept at once they diminish day by day.” also encapsulate this
view.2 In an organizational context, Paine (2004) argues that “most companies are simply not
designed to remember and keep promises over time.” This paper provides the frst experimental
evidence for the robustness of trust, trustworthiness, and promises over time. We document that
communication has a large e˙ect on trust and trustworthiness that remains remarkably persistent
over time.
Trust has been extensively studied in laboratory experiments, mostly using the trust game (Berg
et al., 1995). In this game, an “investor” can send an amount of money to a “trustee.” The amount of
money is multiplied so that sending money is socially eÿcient. The trustee, however, is free to return
money to the investor or not, introducing an element of moral hazard. The game is seen as a vehicle
to study trust (amount sent by investor) and trustworthiness (amount sent back by the trustee).
Many studies fnd that trustees behave, on average, trustworthily: they honor the trust that investors
put in them by sending back a substantial part of the money. A recent meta-analysis (Johnson and
Mislin, 2011) counted 162 replications of the original game, all showing the same pattern. This
appears to be good news, as it suggests that many real-world problems of hidden information or
1
2

The word’s Latin roots ‘pro-’ (forward) and ‘mittere’ (send) also refect this crucial timing aspect.
See Braude (1965) and Hourani (2012), respectively.
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hidden action can be mitigated through trust and trustworthiness. Better still, several recent studies
o˙er experimental evidence that pre-play messages by trustees (e.g., promises), even if they come
in the form of mere cheap talk, considerably enhance trust and subsequent levels of cooperation in
experimental trust and dictator games (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011; Serra-Garcia
et al., 2013; Ismayilov and Potters, 2016; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2017;
Bhattacharya and Sengupta, 2017; Casella et al., 2018).3 Although these messages are non-binding,
they seem to sharpen trustees’ sense of obligation or the amount of guilt that is attached to letting
the investor down.
However, all these studies are limited in one important dimension: time. In previous lab experiments on trust games (with and without communication) hardly any time passes in the period after
the investor’s choice and (if possible) the trustee’s communication and before the trustee’s choice
(in particular, the choice to deliver on any previously sent promise). It is thus possible that the very
short horizon in lab situations between trustee messages and investor choices on the one hand and
trustee choices on the other hand vastly overestimates the extent of reciprocity and trustworthiness
that we may expect in everyday interactions.4
Promises may be less and less likely to be kept over time if an individual is a sequence of shortterm selves (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006) because one’s present self is more similar to yesterday’s
(tomorrow’s) self than to one’s self ten years ago (ten years into the future) and therefore such an
individual may remember (anticipate) more about, and empathize more with, selves from the recent
past (near future) than those from the more distant past (future) (Bénabou and Tirole, 2004). The
philosopher Derek Parft argues that, because psychological connectedness between selves diminishes
over time, moral obligations of promises are stronger over the short term than over the long term
(Parft, 1973). This is of course a normative theory, but its descriptive value remains an empirical
question.5
3
Notable contributions to the broader literature on promise-keeping in political sciences and social psychology
include Ostrom et al. (1992), Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), Sally (1995), and Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007).
4
Some studies investigate the e˙ect of time pressure and very short delays (up to 15 minutes) on decisions in
social dilemmas (Cone and Rand, 2014; Neo et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2014; Bouwmeester et al., 2017). Other studies
delay payments, but not decisions in experimental social dilemmas (Kovarik, 2009; Andreoni and Serra-Garcia, 2016;
Dreber et al., 2016). In all these studies, however, all decisions are still made immediately, during the laboratory
session, and e˙ects on behavior are mixed.
5
Although some psychological studies fnd behavioral e˙ects consistent with the theory of psychological connectedness between multiple selves (Bartels and Rips, 2010; Van Gelder et al., 2013), the only existing test in economics
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To investigate how the passage of time a˙ects trust, trustworthiness, and the power of communication (and promises in particular) we use a one-shot, two-person trust game with pre-play
communication introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The main innovation of our paper
is the introduction of a delay between a) the trustee’s message and the investor’s choice, and b) the
trustee’s decision whether to reciprocate. Trustees in our experiment made their choice either (i)
immediately during the laboratory session (as is common in all previous trust game studies), or (ii)
within 24 hours after leaving the laboratory, or (iii) in a 24 hour window 21 days after the laboratory
session. This allows us to analyze the di˙erential impact of time of trust, trustworthiness, and
promise-keeping, and to compare the new results to the standard laboratory scenario.
Consistent with previous contributions, we fnd that communication raises cooperation by about
50 percent. In addition, we fnd that behavior in trust games without pre-play communication
is essentially una˙ected by the additional delay introduced as part of our experimental design.
Most importantly, our results indicate that the increase in cooperation, trust and trustworthiness
resulting from communication is not diminished even when 3 weeks pass before the trustee’s actual
decision. Thus, we provide the frst evidence for the lasting power of communication and promises
in particular. Our results further suggest that the fndings of previous laboratory studies on trust
and communication extend to more ecologically valid scenarios in which subjects choose actions
outside the lab and long after they made promises.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design.
Section 3 presents our experimental results. Section 4 o˙ers concluding remarks.

2

Experimental Design

We use the one-shot, two-person trust game introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). Figure 1 shows the game tree. The investor (“he”) has two options: choosing a safe outside option
(“OUT”) with equitable but relatively low payo˙s ($15 for each player); or choosing to continue the
game (“IN”). If the investor chooses IN, the trustee (“she”) has two options: one that generates a
high payo˙ for herself ($42) but no money at all for the investor (“DON’T ROLL”); and one where
she receives $30, and the investor’s payo˙ depends on a lottery (or virtual die roll) with a 5/6 chance
fnds no explanatory power of psychological connectedness on intertemporal choice in individual decision-making
(Frederick, 2003).
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of gaining $36 and a 1/6 chance of receiving nothing (“ROLL”). Thus, the selfsh decision for the
trustee is to choose DON’T ROLL. If the investor nonetheless chooses IN, he has to trust that the
trustee deviates from the selfsh choice and instead chooses ROLL.6
(Trustee)
(Communication)
Investor
OUT

IN
Trustee

(15, 15)
DON’T ROLL

ROLL
Nature

(0, 42)
1
6

(0, 30)

5
6

(36, 30)

Figure 1: Game Tree. Note the information set for the investor between “Don’t Roll” and the
negative die roll outcome. In both cases, the investor receives 0. In COMM conditions, the trustee
can send a message before the investor makes her decision. In the NOCOMM conditions, the trustee
cannot send a message.

Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), our frst set of treatment conditions adds a communication stage before the investor’s choice. Depending on the treatment condition, the trustee can
either write a free-form message to the investor before the investor makes her decision (COMM)
or not (NOCOMM). COMM gives the trustee the opportunity to communicate any message she
desires. For example, she may promise that she will choose ROLL. The investor, however, only
observes her own payo˙, which means that she remains uncertain whether the trustee chose ROLL
or DON’T ROLL since even in this case there is a 1/6 chance of the investor receiving nothing.
The trustee makes her decision not knowing whether the investor has chosen IN or OUT. This
allows us to record choices for all trustees, not just for those trustees paired with an investor who
chose IN.
Finally, we allow subjects to submit a mixed strategy, with the probability of IN (ROLL) ranging
from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1. Specifcally, subjects had a menu of 10 IN/OUT (ROLL/DON’T
6

Instructions were framed neutrally with the investor referred to as “person A” and the trustee as “person B.”
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ROLL) radio buttons. After they made their decision the computer chose one of the choices at
random to count as the fnal decision.7

2.1

Delayed Decision

Our primary experimental manipulation—and critical departure from the design of Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006)—introduces a delay before the trustee’s decision. All participants had to complete two short, web-based questionnaire forms, Q1 and Q2, in addition to the laboratory session.
The primary purpose of these two questionnaires was to elicit trustee decisions at two di˙erent
delayed points in time after the lab session had ended. To hold the structure of the experiment
constant across conditions and subject roles, every participant had to complete Q1 and Q2 which
slightly di˙ered in content.8
Subjects could access Q1 in a 24 hour window after leaving the laboratory, and Q2 in a 24 hour
window 21 days after the laboratory session. To minimize attrition, we created strong monetary
incentives to complete the online part of the study. At the end of the laboratory session, subjects
only received their show-up fee, and all the remaining payments only after completing both online
questionnaires. Depending on the condition, the trustee chose ROLL/DON’T either just before
flling out Q1 (EARLY), or just before flling out Q2 (LATE). In an additional condition, we
administered Q1 at the end of the laboratory session, so that trustees made their decision while still
in the laboratory (IMM).
The crucial identifcation of the delay e˙ect is the comparison between the EARLY and LATE
conditions. We conducted the IMM condition to compare our results to the usual experimental
setting of trust games, where subjects make all their decisions at once, during the laboratory session.
We kept the decision-making process as similar to the EARLY and LATE conditions as possible.
Most importantly, in the IMM condition, subjects flled out the same browser-based questionnaire
they would have seen in the other conditions, they still had to complete the Q2 questionnaire three
weeks later, and they were paid only after completion of Q2. However, other aspects of the decision
environment cannot be kept constant: in IMM sessions, trustees were still in the laboratory and
7

As we show in Section 3 subjects made little use of this more nuanced strategy space.
Q1 elicited subjects’ frst- and second-order beliefs and asked for free-form explanations of their laboratory
decisions; Q2 revealed the existence of the other delay condition and asked for subjects’ beliefs about the other delay.
See Appendix A for a detailed timeline of tasks and questions in the lab part and the questionnaires (Q1 and Q2)
part of the experiment.
8
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made their decisions with the investors and the experimenter still in the same room, which in itself
may increase their propensity to choose ROLL.
Our 2 × 3 between-subjects design yields six di˙erent conditions:
• No Communication: NOCOMM-IMM, NOCOMM-EARLY, NOCOMM-LATE
• Communication: COMM-IMM, COMM-EARLY, COMM-LATE

2.2

Procedures

We conducted 40 experimental sessions with a total of 707 student subjects at the University of
Zurich and at Yale University.9 Subjects were assigned to visually partitioned computer terminals.
At each terminal they found paper instructions, which were also read aloud by the experimenter.
Questions were answered individually at the subjects’ seats. Subjects interacted with another
randomly chosen participant from the same session. All subjects were paid after 21 days with
Amazon gift vouchers.10 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).

3

Results

3.1
3.1.1

Subject Behavior
Attrition

Despite the signifcant time delay between the two parts of the experiments attrition rates are very
low. Only 0.8 percent of trustees (2.3 percent of investors) did not complete Q1 (the frst of the
two surveys). 5.1 percent of trustees (7.4 percent of investors) did not complete Q2 (the second
survey, administered three weeks after the initial session). By design, the Q1 attrition rate is zero
for trustees in the IMM conditions. For trustees in the EARLY delay condition, the Q1 attrition
rate is 1.7 percent whereas for trustees in the LATE delay, the Q2 attrition rate is 3.3 percent.
9
Three subjects participated twice in this experiment due to walk-ins at the Yale lab. We removed their second
appearance in the data.
10
For the Zurich sessions, the money was mailed in cash to the recipients. The US dollar amounts were paid out
at a ratio of 1:1 in Swiss francs. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was about 0.966 CHF/USD.

7

These low attrition rates are due to our experimental design which provided strong incentives to
complete the additional surveys.
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Choices

10

3.1.2

COMM

IMM EARLY LATE

IMM EARLY LATE

COMM

IMM EARLY LATE

IMM EARLY LATE

Average number of IN choices
4
6
8

NOCOMM

2
0

0

Average number of ROLL choices
2
4
6
8

NOCOMM

(a) Trustees: ROLL choices

(b) Investors: IN choices

Figure 2: Roll Decisions; In Decisions. Error bars indicate standard errors, allowing for clustered
errors on the session level.

We frst study the behavior of trustees in our six treatment conditions. Panel (a) of Figure 2
shows the number of times a trustee chooses ROLL. When there is no communication trustees choose
to roll on average between 38 percent to 35 percent of the time while this number increased to around
55 to 58 percent of the time when communication was possible. These e˙ects of communication
are statistically signifcant for all three delay conditions (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test: p-values
0.019, 0.017, 0.034). As expected, with immediate choices communication greatly and signifcantly
increases cooperation by trustees by about 20 percentage points (or 50 percent), consistent with
previous studies on trust games with pre-play communication. More surprisingly, however, this
positive e˙ect of communication persists over time and is essentially unchanged across the three
delay conditions. In contrast, within both NOCOMM and COMM conditions the time delay between
the initial session and the roll decision has only a negligibly small and statistically insignifcant e˙ect
on roll rates.
8

Panel (b) shows that investors are signifcantly more trusting when communication is possible.
In the treatments with communication investors increase their IN choices by roughly 20 percentage
points, that is, a large increase comparable in size to the increase in ROLL choices. This e˙ect is
again almost uniform across the di˙erent delay treatments and mirrors the pattern shown in Panel
(a). Communication signifcantly raises the rate of opt-in choices in all three delay conditions (pvalues 0.015, 0.001, 0.018), but within both NOCOMM and COMM conditions there is no signifcant
di˙erence behavior due to di˙erent time delay.
Figure 2 also suggests that neither trustworthiness nor trust decline substantially across the
di˙erent delay conditions. All twelve pairwise comparisons between delay conditions are statistically
insignifcant.11
Table 1 reports the regression analysis estimates which confrm the visual impression. The
omitted category is IMM. Communication raises the ROLL rate by 1.80 ROLL choices in the IMM
condition (p = 0.007), by 1.91 in EARLY (p = 0.089), and by 1.77 in LATE (p = 0.006).12 Again,
delay has no discernible e˙ect. There is no statistical di˙erence between the IMM and EARLY
conditions (NOCOMM: p = 0.719, COMM: p = 0.859), IMM and LATE (p = 0.658, p = 0.565), or
EARLY and LATE (p = 0.983, p = 0.854).
The same pattern emerges from the second column, where we analyze investors’ IN decisions.
Communication signifcantly raises trust in all three delay conditions (IMM: p = 0.005, EARLY:
p = 0.005, LATE: p = 0.019), and with the exception of the dip in the NOCOMM-EARLY treatment
we do not fnd any substantial di˙erences across delay conditions.13
In these regressions, we included two controls for time and risk preferences, as well as age and
gender of the participant.14 Older participants tend to be both more trusting and more trustworthy.
Furthermore, more risk tolerant participants tend to be more trusting.
11
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests (a) ROLL: NOCOMM: IMM-EARLY p = 0.663, IMM-LATE p = 0.470, EARLYLATE p = 0.833; COMM: IMM-EARLY p = 0.843, IMM-LATE p = 0.622, EARLY-LATE p = 0.778. (b) IN:
NOCOMM: IMM-EARLY p = 0.233, IMM-LATE p = 0.625, EARLY-LATE p = 0.540; COMM: IMM-EARLY
p = 0.882, IMM-LATE p = 0.684, EARLY-LATE p = 0.762.
12
We report Wald tests whenever we test linear combinations of coeÿcients.
13
IMM vs. EARLY: NOCOMM p = 0.091, COMM p = 0.932; IMM vs. LATE: p = 0.569, p = 0.659; EARLY vs.
LATE: p = 0.076, p = 0.699.
14
We presented subjects with two multiple-price lists (MPLs) at the end of the laboratory session, one measuring
risk preference (MPL-R) and the other time preference (MPL-T). The MPL-R task asked for subjects’ certainty
equivalent for a 50-50 lottery between $15 and $0, the MPL-T task asked for their preference between a fxed $10
early payment and a late payment that varied between $10 and $15.
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Table 1: Behavior of Trustees and Investors
ROLL
EARLY

-0.281
(0.774)
-0.299
(0.671)
1.800***
(0.638)
0.105
(1.282)
-0.035
(0.874)
0.106
(0.080)
0.169
(0.163)
0.084**
(0.034)
-0.480
(0.489)
-0.005
(1.418)

LATE
COMM
EARLY × COMM
LATE × COMM
Time Preference
Risk Preference
Age (years) i
Female
Constant

IN
-0.912*
(0.527)
-0.276
(0.480)
1.828***
(0.618)
0.997
(1.135)
-0.084
(0.936)
-0.050
(0.075)
0.599***
(0.100)
0.093***
(0.030)
0.290
(0.428)
-2.014
(1.313)

adj. R-squared
0.054
0.151
N
353
353
Clusters
40
40
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS regressions, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the
session level. Risk preference: number of risky choices in MPL-R;
Time preference: number of later choices in MPL-T.

3.1.3

Promises

Our previous analysis documents that ROLL rates di˙er across communication treatments, but do
not di˙er across delay conditions. We now investigate how trustees in the communication conditions
use their freeform messages to induce higher levels of cooperation. In order to do so we classifed
the messages into whether they contained an explicit promise of choosing ROLL (e.g., “I will choose
ROLL” or “I promise to choose ROLL”) and into whether they did not (e.g., “a singer in a smoky
room, a smell of wine and cheap perfume”). The rate of promises is not higher in the EARLY and
LATE conditions as one could suspect if subjects were trying to prevent a potential decay of trust
with the time delay. 31 out of 58 trustees in COMM-IMM make a promise, 33 out of 56 trustees in
10

COMM-EARLY, and 30 out of 58 in COMM-LATE.
Recall that the COMM conditions have a 50 percent higher roll rate than the NOCOMM conditions (an average of 5.6 ROLL choices in COMM versus 3.7 in NOCOMM). We can now decompose
this e˙ect into those trustees who made an explicit promise versus those who did not. Those who
made promises have an even higher roll rate of an average 6.3 ROLL choices. In contrast, those
who did not make a promise have a lower roll rate of 4.7. However, this roll rate is still higher than
that observed in the NOCOMM conditions.15
Furthermore, we observe that subjects do not make use of mixed strategies. Recall that subjects
saw ten radio buttons for their choice, one of which was randomly implemented. Only 25 percent of
trustees choose a mixture of the two choices while 75 percent choose either ten times ROLL or ten
times DON’T ROLL. The option to make 10 di˙erent choices introduces the possibility of moral
wiggle room in the communication conditions. A trustee could potentially stick to the letter of her
promise “I will choose ROLL” while only choosing ROLL for a part of her 10 choices. However,
we do not see an increased use of mixed strategies if trustees make a promise. On the contrary, if
anything, pure-strategy use is higher if the trustee made a promise (78 percent) than if she did not
make a promise (67 percent), consistent with subjects sticking to the spirit of the promise and not
exploiting loopholes in the wording.16

3.1.4

Message Recall

Recall that we did not remind trustees of the message they sent before they made their ROLL
choices. This created an opportunity for biased recollection or motivated forgetting of the message
on behalf of the trustees. To test how well trustees remembered the content of the message, we
asked them to re-write their message as accurately as possible directly after their ROLL decisions.
We did not provide monetary incentives for accuracy. We then again classifed the remembered
messages into explicit promises and other messages.
In general, the overlap between original and remembered messages is high. 78.1 percent of
recalled messages are classifed in the same category as the original message. When the original
15

If we regress number of rolls on a communication condition dummy and an additional dummy that is one if
and only if the trustee made a promise, adjusting for clustered standard errors on the session level, we obtain a
marginally signifcant coeÿcient for communication condition without promise (p = 0.100) and a larger, additional
e˙ect of actually making a promise (p = 0.056).
16
However, this di˙erence is not statistically signifcant (p = 0.124, Fisher’s exact test).

11

message contained a promise, the concordance was even higher. 85.7 percent of trustees remembered
that they made a promise. Furthermore, accuracy does not decline over time, as messages from
the LATE condition still have a category concordance of 78.0 percent with 80.0 percent of original
messages containing a promise.
Among the messages that do not contain an explicit promise, many took the form of an appeal
to eÿciency, in the generic form of “the best thing we can do to maximize our earnings is to go IN
and ROLL.” We did not classify these appeals as explicit promises. However, it seems that trustees
actually wanted to make a promise when they wrote such messages. 29.2 percent of trustees who
originally wrote about striving for the eÿcient outcome later recalled a message that we classify as
an explicit promise.
Finally, we obtain virtually the same ROLL rates when we split trustees into those who recalled
making a promise and those who did not as when we split trustees according to their original
message (see Section 3.1.3). Trustees who did not remember making a concrete promise had an
average rate of 4.7 ROLL choices while those who did had a rate of 6.5 ROLL choices. In summary,
we fnd little evidence for systematic distortions of memory, either intentional or unintentional.

3.2

Beliefs

In addition to subjects’ behavior, we also elicited their frst-order beliefs about how many times their
matched trustee (investor) would choose ROLL (IN). We call these responses FOB1. In addition,
we asked each investor about the aggregate percentage of ROLL decisions and each trustee about
the aggregate percentage of IN decisions in their session. We call these responses FOB2.17
We also elicited trustees’ second-order beliefs about the matched investor’s frst-order beliefs.
We call these second-order beliefs SOB. At the end of Q2, we also elicited frst-order beliefs about
the other delay condition. That is, at the end of the study, we revealed the existence of the EARLY
(LATE) condition to those subjects participating in the LATE (IMM/EARLY) condition and asked
investors about trustees (or investors) about the aggregate percentage of IN (or ROLL) decisions in
the other delay condition. We term these responses FOB-O.18
Our measures for frst-order beliefs FOB1 and FOB2 are signifcantly higher in the communi17

We did not provide monetary incentives for FOB1 to avoid hedging, but we incentivized FOB2 with a bonus of
$5 if the guess fell within 10 percentage points of the actual value.
18
Note that we did not elicit all beliefs in all sessions, resulting in varying sample sizes for these beliefs below.
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0
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0

0

IMM EARLY LATE

(c) SOB: ROLL
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Average number of IN choices (FOB1)
2
4
6
8

COMM
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(e) FOB2: IN
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bel. LATE
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Average number of IN choices (FOB−O)
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(d) FOB1: IN
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bel. LATE
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COMM
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EARLY
bel. LATE

LATE
bel. IMM

LATE
bel. EARLY

(g) FOB-O: IN

Figure 3: 1st-order beliefs about partner; 1st-order beliefs about population; 2nd-order beliefs about
partner (Trustees only); 1st-order beliefs about other delay condition

cation treatments. Thus, our results suggest that communication increases trust even over time
horizons as long as 3 weeks. The only exception are second-order beliefs in the early delay condition
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where the positive e˙ect of communication is marginally signifcantly weaker.
Indeed, Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c show that communication consistently raises frst- and secondorder beliefs about ROLLS. Although there is more variation in the positive e˙ect of communication
on frst- and second-order beliefs than for roll rates, the magnitudes are quite similar. On average,
communication raises beliefs by about 20 percentage points.
Table 2 again confrms the visual impression of a large and persistent e˙ect of communication
on trust and trustworthiness. Investors have higher expectations about the roll rates of trustees
and therefore behave more trustingly when communication is allowed, but there is no evidence that
greater delay has any signifcant e˙ect, except for the marginally signifcant “dip” in the FOB2
measure in the NOCOMM-EARLY condition we already saw with the IN choices.
Table 2: Beliefs of Trustees and Investors

EARLY
LATE
COMM
EARLY × COMM
LATE × COMM
Time Preference
Risk Preference
Age (years)
Female
Constant

FOB1: ROLL

FOB2: ROLL

FOB1: IN

FOB2: IN

SOB: ROLL

-0.882
(0.525)
-0.790
(0.579)
1.959***
(0.592)
-0.668
(1.014)
0.508
(0.913)
-0.038
(0.075)
0.208
(0.130)
0.071***
(0.024)
0.337
(0.492)
2.046*
(1.039)

-1.168**
(0.526)
-0.469
(0.282)
1.608***
(0.432)
0.864
(0.726)
0.119
(0.569)
-0.021
(0.062)
0.302***
(0.095)
0.059***
(0.020)
-0.157
(0.370)
1.233
(0.783)

-0.214
(0.659)
-0.255
(0.735)
2.606***
(0.766)
-1.343
(0.834)
-0.053
(0.987)
0.023
(0.098)
0.002
(0.148)
0.015
(0.024)
-0.216
(0.460)
3.966**
(1.492)

0.010
(0.715)
0.448
(0.535)
2.008***
(0.537)
0.384
(0.981)
0.356
(0.742)
-0.009
(0.074)
0.136
(0.138)
0.046**
(0.020)
0.137
(0.326)
1.504
(1.025)

0.049
(0.602)
0.268
(0.388)
1.382***
(0.413)
-0.671
(0.772)
0.335
(0.488)
0.019
(0.059)
0.102
(0.099)
0.022
(0.022)
0.058
(0.296)
2.076**
(0.971)

adj. R-squared
0.101
0.134
0.097
0.122
0.054
354
N
249
353
186
261
Clusters
36
40
32
36
40
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS regressions, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the session level. Risk preference:
number of risky choices in MPL-R; Time preference: number of later choices in MPL-T.
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Taken together, our data on both actual behavior and beliefs suggest a surprising persistence
over time of trustworthiness in general and promises in particular. Even when trustees make their
decisions outside of the lab and as long as 3 weeks after they communicated with investors, they
still behave in essentially the same way as when they decide immediately in the lab. In any time
frame, they behave more generously towards investors when communication (and thus promises)
are possible. Investors anticipate both the relevance of promises, increasing their trust greatly when
promises are made, and the irrelevance of the time frame, exhibiting the same rate of trust across
all time frames.

3.3

Online Experiment

To replicate our laboratory fndings with a larger set of subjects, we also conducted an online
experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Although, in the above analysis, the regression
coeÿcients for delay are insignifcant, one could argue that we do see a slight negative trend, and
that we are underpowered to pick up the decay in trustworthiness and trust with our sample size.
The sample size of the laboratory experiment was mainly limited by logistics. Over 700 subjects
participated in the experiment, with about 60 trustees per condition, which is about the maximum
feasible sample size in economic laboratory experiments. While the novel design and research
question did not allow for a prospective power analysis, we can compare our null result of delay
with the highly signifcant treatment e˙ect of communication we observe. With this sample size we
could clearly detect an e˙ect size of 0.43 (Cohen’s d) of communication, making us suspect (post
hoc) that we would have picked up a delay e˙ect of similar size. To exclude that we missed small
to medium e˙ect sizes (below 0.4), we therefore replicate our fnding in an online experiment, with
substantially larger sample size.

4

Conclusion

A large literature beginning with Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) has documented the positive
e˙ect of pre-play communication on cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness in experimental trust
games. However, the external validity of these studies remains limited because they force trustees
to take their actions immediately after communicating with investors. In contrast, most real-word
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instances of promises involve a signifcant delay between communicating the promise and delivering
on it. In fact, one of the primary roles of promises is to facilitate production and exchange over
time.
Using a hybrid lab and online experiment we provided the frst evidence for the persistent
power of communication over time. In our trust experiment, trustees chose how much to return to
investors either (i) immediately in the lab, (ii) in a 24 hour window after they left the lab, or (iii)
3 weeks after they left the lab. Even when 3 weeks passed between the communication stage and
actual choices, communication raised cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50% and this
positive e˙ect is as large as when choices immediately follow communication. Our results suggest
that the fndings of previous laboratory studies on trust in general, and promises in particular,
extend to more ecologically valid scenarios in which subjects choose actions outside the lab and
long after they made promises.
The surprisingly large and persistent e˙ect of communication naturally raises a number of additional questions about the role of communication. For example, at what point does the persistence
of communication diminish? What institutional arrangements could enhance potentially decaying
trust over time? We leave these and other interesting questions for future research.

References
Andreoni, James and Marta Serra-Garcia, “Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving,” Working
Paper 22824, National Bureau of Economic Research November 2016.
Arrow, K.J., The Limits of Organization Fels Center of Government Series, Norton, 1974.
Bartels, Daniel M and Lance J Rips, “Psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice,”
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2010, 139 (1), 49–69.
Bartolomeo, Giovanni Di, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa, and Francesco Passarelli,
“Promises, Expectations, and Causation,” Sapienza University of Rome Working Paper, 2017.
Ben-Ner, Avner and Louis Putterman, “Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 70 (1), 106 – 121.

16

Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10 (1), 122–142.
Bhattacharya, Puja and Arjun Sengupta, “Promises and Guilt,” OSU Working Paper, 2017.
Bicchieri, C. and A. Lev-On, “Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2007, 6 (2), 139–
168.
Bouwmeester, S., P. P. J. L. Verkoeijen, B. Aczel, F. Barbosa, L. Bègue, P. BrañasGarza, T. G. H. Chmura, G. Cornelissen, F. S. Døssing, A. M. Espín, A. M. Evans,
F. Ferreira-Santos, S. Fiedler, J. Flegr, M. Gha˙ari, A. Glöckner, T. Goeschl, L. Guo,
O. P. Hauser, R. Hernan-Gonzalez, A. Herrero, Z. Horne, P. Houdek, M. Johannesson, L. Koppel, P. Kujal, T. Laine, J. Lohse, E. C. Martins, C. Mauro, D. Mischkowski, S. Mukherjee, K. O. R. Myrseth, D. Navarro-Martínez, T. M. S. Neal,
J. Novakova, R. Pagà, T. O. Paiva, B. Palf, M. Piovesan, R.-M. Rahal, E. Salomon,
N. Srinivasan, A. Srivastava, B. Szaszi, A. Szollosi, K. Ø. Thor, G. Tinghög, J. S.
Trueblood, J. J. Van Bavel, A. E. van ‘t Veer, D. Västfjäll, M. Warner, E. Wengström,
J. Wills, and C. E. Wollbrant, “Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak
(2012),” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2017, 12 (3), 527–542. PMID: 28475467.
Braude, Jacob Morton, Proverbs, epigrams, aphorisms, sayings, and bon mots, Prentice Hall,
1965.
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole, “Willpower and Personal Rules,” Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 112 (4), 848–886.
Casella, Alessandra, Navin Kartik, Luis Sanchez, and Sébastien Turban, “Communication
in context: Interpreting promises in an experiment on competition and trust,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 2018.
Charness, Gary and Martin Dufwenberg, “Promises and partnership,” Econometrica, 2006,
74 (6), 1579–1601.
and

, “Participation,” American Economic Review, June 2011, 101 (4), 1211–1237.
17

Cone, Jeremy and David G Rand, “Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed
social dilemmas,” PLoS one, 2014, 9 (12), e115756.
Dreber, Anna, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, and David Rand, “Self-Control, Social
Preferences and the E˙ect of Delayed Payments,” SSRN Working Paper, 2016.
Ederer, Florian and Alexander Stremitzer, “Promises and expectations,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 106, 161–178.
Ellingsen, Tore and Magnus Johannesson, “Promises, Threats and Fairness,” Economic Journal, 2004, 114 (495), 397–420.
Fischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments,” Experimental
Economics, 2007, 10, 171–178.
Frederick, Shane, “Time preference and personal identity,” Time and decision, 2003, pp. 89–113.
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine, “A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control,” American
Economic Review, 2006, 96 (5), 1449–1476.
Gelder, Jean-Louis Van, Hal E Hershfeld, and Loran F Nordgren, “Vividness of the future
self predicts delinquency,” Psychological science, 2013, 24 (6), 974–980.
Hourani, Fayek S, Daily Bread for Your Mind and Soul: A Handbook of Transcultural Proverbs
and Sayings, Xlibris, 2012.
Ismayilov, H. and J. Potters, “Why do promises a˙ect trustworthiness, or do they?,” Experimental Economics, 2016, 19, 382–393.
Johnson, Noel and Alexandra A. Mislin, “Trust games: A meta-analysis,” Journal of Economic
Psychology, 2011, 32 (5), 865–889.
Kerr, N. L. and C. M. Kaufman-Gilliland, “Communication, Commitment and Cooperation
in Social Dilemma,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994, 66 (3), 513–529.
Kovarik, Jaromir, “Giving it now or later: Altruism and discounting,” Economics Letters, 2009,
102 (3), 152–154.
18

Neo, Wei Siong, Michael Yu, Roberto A Weber, and Cleotilde Gonzalez, “The e˙ects of
time delay in reciprocity games,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013, 34, 20–35.
Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner, “Covenants With and Without a Sword: SelfGovernance Is Possible,” American Political Science Review, 1992, 86 (2), 404–417.
Paine, Lynn Sharp, Value Shift: Why Companies Must Merge Social and Financial Imperatives
to Achieve Superior Performance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.
Parft, Derek, “Later Selves and Moral Principles,” in Alan Montefore, ed., Philosophy and Personal Relations, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 149–160.
Rand, David G, Alexander Peysakhovich, Gordon T Kraft-Todd, George E Newman,
Owen Wurzbacher, Martin A Nowak, and Joshua D Greene, “Social heuristics shape
intuitive cooperation,” Nature communications, 2014, 5, 3677.
Sally, David, “Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments
from 1958 to 1992,” Rationality and Society, 1995, 7 (1), 58–92.
Serra-Garcia, Marta, Eric van Damme, and Jan Potters, “Lying About What You Know or
About What You Do?,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013, 11 (5), 1204–1229.
Vanberg, Christoph, “Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations,” Econometrica, 2008, 76 (6), 1467–1480.
Weymar, Paul, Konrad Adenauer: Die autorisierte Biographie, Kindler, 1955.

19

A

Structure of Lab Session and Online Questionnaires

Table 3: Order of tasks and questionnaires across conditions. Q1 was available online for 24 hours
after the laboratory session in EARLY and LATE conditions, and was administered in the laboratory
immediately following the “Laboratory” part in the IMM condition. For the online experiment, the
“Laboratory” part was also conducted online,
Part

IMM/EARLY

LATE
Instructions
Comprehension Questions
[COMM: Message from Trustee to Investor]
Comprehension Questions
Decision Investor
Multiple Price List - Time
Multiple Price List - Risk
Questionnaire: socioeconomic data
Questionnaire: attitudes (time, risk, trust)
Questionnaire: Machiavellism

Laboratory

Decision Trustee∗
[COMM: Message recall∗ ]
First-Order Belief 2†
First-Order Belief 1†
Second-Order Belief†
Free-form explanation of IN/ROLL decision†
Free-form explanation of MPL-Time decision
Free-form explanation of MPL-Risk decision

Q1

Decision Trustee∗
[COMM: Message recall∗ ]
First-Order Belief 2∗
First-Order Belief 1∗
Second-Order Belief∗
Second-Order Belief∗

Q2

First-Order Belief Other
Free-form explanation of FOB Other
Free-form explanation of ROLL decision∗
∗

Only trustees

†

Except trustees in LATE
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B

Supplementary Material: Subject Instructions
Instructions
Thank you for participating in today’s study.

I will read through a script to explain to you the nature of today’s experiment as well as how
to navigate the computer interface with which you will be working. I will use this script to
make sure that the information given in all sessions of this study is the same.

In addition to a $10 payment that you receive for your participation, you will be paid an
amount of money that you accumulate from the decision task that will be described to you in
a moment. The total amount you receive will be determined during the experiment and will
depend on your decisions as well as the decisions of others.

If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an
experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked
to leave the experiment with only their participation payment.
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Timeline of the experiment
As already mentioned in the invitation e-mail, this study requires you to answer two
questionnaires, besides participating in today’s laboratory session. Each questionnaire will
take no more than 10 minutes to complete. The link for the second questionnaire will be sent
to you via e-mail.
▪

The first questionnaire must be completed at the end of this session. We will come to
your computer station and switch the program to an internet browser window for this.

▪

The second questionnaire must be completed within a 24-hour window, starting 3
weeks from today (on Friday, October 27, 12pm – Saturday, October 28, 12pm).

Important: You will only be paid for this study if you complete this laboratory session and
both questionnaires. At this point, please let the experimenter know if you will be
unable to complete the online questionnaire three weeks from now.

Payment
The experiment comprises 10 decision tasks. In each of these decisions, you have the
opportunity to earn money. At the end of the experiment, we will pay you the amount of
money produced by one randomly selected decision. Each of the 10 decisions is equally
likely to be chosen for payment.
Moreover, you will have the possibility to earn an additional amount of money in other tasks.
Your final payment at the end of the experiment will consist of the money obtained in one
randomly chosen decision, the amount obtained from the additional tasks, and the
participation payment.
Your participation payment ($10) will be paid out in cash at the end this session. Your
remaining payment will be paid to you as an Amazon voucher three weeks from now. It will
be sent to your email address after the conclusion of the second questionnaire. Depending on
your decision in an additional task, you may receive a part of your payment sooner, also as an
Amazon voucher. If you receive money from this task, the voucher will be sent to you by
tomorrow. No participant will be told the payoffs of other participants.
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Decision Task
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with another participant.
This will be the only participant with whom you will interact. All interactions will be
anonymous and will take place through a computer. This means that you will never know the
identity of the other participant with whom you are matched, and this participant will never
know your identity.
In each pair, one participant will have the role of Person A and the other will have the role of
Person B. Roles will be assigned randomly, by the computer. The amount of money you will
earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.
At the beginning of the decision task, each Person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to
choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, the task ends and both, A and B, receive $15.
Next, each Person B will indicate whether he or she wants to choose ROLL or DON`T ROLL.
Note that when Person B makes her decision, she will not know about A’s previous decision.
However, the decision of Person B will only make a difference when A has actually chosen
IN. Therefore, for the purpose of making this decision, Person B should presume that the
paired Person A has chosen IN, since this is the only case in which Person B’s decision will
matter.
Assuming that A has chosen IN, then:
•

If B chooses DON’T ROLL, A’s payoff is $0 and B’s payoff is $42.

•

If B chooses ROLL, then the payoffs for the two people in the pair are determined by
the (computerized) roll of a six-sided die. If the die roll is 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 then A’s
payoff is $36 and B’s payoff is $30. If the die roll is 1, then A’s payoff is $0 and B’s
payoff is $30. This information is summarized in the following chart:

Payoffs
Payoff of A

Payoff of B

A chooses OUT

$15

$15

A chooses IN and B chooses DON'T ROLL

$0

$42

A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL, die = 1

$0

$30

A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL, die =2, 3, 4, 5, 6

$36

$30
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You will make 10 decisions in the task just described. In each decision you will be interacting
with the same other person. Specifically, each Person A in a pair will make the decision
whether to choose OUT or IN ten times and each Person B in a pair will make the decision
whether to ROLL or DON’T ROLL ten times. Remember that only one of these 10 decisions
in a pair will be selected to count for payment.
Person B’s decision will be made at the end of this session. B will choose whether to ROLL or
DON’T ROLL when answering the first questionnaire.
The experiment consists of 5 steps that are described below in more detail.

Step 1: Enter your email address
Before the decision task starts, you will be prompted on the screen to provide your email
address. After the conclusion of the entire experiment, that is, after you complete both
questionnaires in three weeks, the final payoff from the above decision task, as well as
additional tasks, will be emailed to this address as an Amazon voucher.
To receive your payments, it is very important that you provide the correct email address.
Your email address is treated confidentially and is only used to send the questionnaire link
and to transfer your payments.

Step 2: Role assignment
At the beginning of the decision task, you will be randomly paired with another participant by
the computer. However, no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom
he or she is matched. In each pair, one person will then be randomly assigned the role of
Person A and the other the role of Person B. It is equally likely that you will be assigned to
either role. Your role will be displayed on the computer screen. You will remain in the same
role throughout the experiment.

Step 3: Communication Phase
After role assignment, but before participants make their 10 decisions in the decision task,
Person B will have an option to send a written message to Person A, if desired. This message
can be seen by A before she will have to make a decision.
Important: You are not allowed to reveal your identity. (That is, you are not allowed to reveal
your name, or any other identifying feature such as gender, appearance etc.) The experimenter
will monitor the messages. Violations of these rules will result in the exclusion from the
experiment and all payments for B. In this case, the paired Person A will then get the
participation fee as well as the payoff that would arise if he or she chose OUT, i.e. $15.
Also, please refrain from using profane or offensive language.
Other than these restrictions, person B is free to send any message.
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Step 4: Decision by Person A
Each Person A will indicate whether to choose IN or OUT. Since there are ten decisions,
Person A will decide for each decision separately whether to choose IN or OUT. For the
decisions in which A chooses OUT, Person B’s decisions are irrelevant and both receive
payoffs of $15. For the decisions in which A chooses IN, Person B’s decisions of whether to
ROLL or DON’T ROLL, possibly along with the outcome of a die roll, will determine
payoffs.

Step 5: Decision by Person B
This step will be conducted at the end this session, while you are completing the first
questionnaire. When completing the questionnaire, each Person B will decide whether to
choose ROLL or DON’T ROLL for each of the ten decisions. These choices will determine the
payoffs for those decisions in which Person A chose IN.
As mentioned above, B will not be told about A’s decisions before submitting his or her
decisions. For the decisions in which B chooses DON’T ROLL, the task ends at that point. For
the decisions in which B chooses ROLL, a separate computerized die roll determines the
payoffs for A and B for each decision.
For each pair, one of the 10 decisions will be randomly selected to count. For this decision,
Person A’s choice of IN or OUT, and Person B’s choice of ROLL or DON’T ROLL, which is
made during the first questionnaire, at the end of this session, will determine payments.
Remember that you will only be paid in three weeks, after you have completed the online
questionnaire. You will not be affected if you complete the study but the person with whom
you are matched fails to complete both questionnaires.

Additional tasks:
In addition to the above task, you will be presented with some additional tasks, at the end of
this session and in the later questionnaire. Instructions for these tasks will be displayed on
your screen before you begin the respective task. For some of these tasks, you may
accumulate additional money. However, the choices that you make in these additional tasks
will never affect the outcome of the 10 decisions described above.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
We will now proceed to a few comprehension questions to ensure that the instructions are
clear to everybody.
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